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ABSTRACT
Schizophrenia as a pathology of self-awareness has attracted 
much attention from philosophical theorists and empirical 
scientists alike. I view schizophrenia as a basic self-disturbance 
leading to a lifeworld of solipsism adopted by the sufferer and 
explain how this adoption takes place, which then manifests 
in ways such as first-rank psychotic symptoms. I then discuss 
the relationships between these symptoms, not as isolated 
mental events, but as end-products of a loss of agency and 
ownership, and argue that symptoms like thought insertion 
and other ego-boundary disorders are by nature a multitude of 
paradoxes created by a fragmented awareness. I argue that such 
fragmentation does not always require or lead to a delusional 
elaboration as the definitive feature of its phenomenology, 
and present reasons for the role of the first-person pronoun 
as a mere metaphor used to represent the patient’s bizarre 
experiences where sensory perception and thinking processes 
converge. Further, I discuss the initial benefits of adopting 
a solipsistic stance and how despite being a maladaptive 
strategy, it nevertheless acts as a protective barrier for the 
integrity of one’s self. Lastly, I offer some suggestions for clinical 
practice, emphasizing the importance of understanding the 
patient’s suffering in any therapeutic alliance.
1. Introduction
Schizophrenia has been the focus of a tremendous amount of theoretical and 
empirical research since its name was first coined by Swiss psychiatrist Eugen 
Bleuler over one hundred years ago. Originally termed “dementia praecox,” it was 
first thought to be a chronic neurodegenerative disorder following an inevitably 
deteriorating course (Ashe, Berry, & Boulton, 2001; Lieberman, 1999), although 
more recently the notion of chronicity and deterioration has been challenged 
by clinicians, researchers, and patients alike (Zipursky, Reilly, & Murray, 2013). 
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2   C. S. HUMPSTON
Nevertheless, more often than not schizophrenia still has a devastating impact 
on the patient and leads to great pain and suffering, whether it is in the form of 
an acute psychotic episode or long-term disabilities. As a result, the importance 
of schizophrenia research cannot be underestimated.
There are several prominent theories about the nature and pathogenesis of 
schizophrenia ranging from the biochemical to the philosophical. However, what 
are thought to be the hallmarks of schizophrenia (delusions and hallucinations, i.e., 
reality distortions) in the current diagnostic systems bear little resemblance to its 
original clinical core (Parnas, 2011), which converges toward a basic and funda-
mental change in one’s experiences of the self (and also, subsequently, the world). 
Even more fundamental to the experience of one’s self is the minimal awareness 
of one’s conscious cognitive state (Cermolacce, Naudin, & Parnas, 2007; Sass & 
Parnas, 2003), thoughts, and actions, as these are undoubtedly the prerequisites 
to constructing a more sophisticated identity. It is in this theoretical framework 
that I put forward an account of schizophrenia as fundamentally a pathology of 
self-awareness, in which the paradoxes caused by such pathology in turn create 
the first-rank psychotic symptoms and lead to reality distortions as secondary 
consequences, rather than primary manifestations, of the disorder.
The primary manifestations of schizophrenia, in my opinion, and as are com-
patible with many other theorists’ views (e.g., Sass & Parnas, 2003), are basic 
self-disturbances leading to the adoption of a solipsistic lifeworld that provides 
fertile ground for the development of psychotic phenomena such as first-rank 
symptoms. This paper aims to provide an integrated account of the structure of 
self-disorders found in schizophrenia and shed further light on the issues of par-
adoxicality and solipsism which are often overlooked or ignored in the clinic. In 
particular, I hope to contribute to deciphering the puzzle of how a patient adopts a 
solipsistic stance in the first place. Given the benefits of applying phenomenologi-
cal theories to actual clinical practice (Škodlar, Henriksen, Sass, Nelson, & Parnas, 
2013), such an analysis is necessary for, and beneficial to, the current debates about 
the nature of self-awareness in schizophrenia, as it can lead to further phenom-
enological insights and implications for both research and therapeutic advances.
2. Schizophrenia as a self-disturbance
Schizophrenia is far from a homogenous entity: from individuals’ levels of func-
tioning to the myriad of symptoms any given individual could experience, diag-
nostically speaking at least, there is no overwhelming consensus on what its true 
“pathognomonic” features are. Indeed, due to this heterogeneity, two individuals 
could receive the same diagnosis of schizophrenia with absolutely no overlap in 
symptoms. Further, it is extremely difficult to predict future onset of schizophrenia 
based on observations of early psychosis symptoms; even in individuals at clinical 
high risk (for example, those displaying signs of attenuated positive symptoms, i.e., 
delusional ideation and hallucinations) the actual “transition” rate to a psychotic 
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PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY  3
disorder is approximately 30% (Fusar-Poli et al., 2012). The search for a predictive 
“marker,” therefore, has significant diagnostic value and strong implications for 
early intervention.
Of all the hopeful candidates for such a marker, self-disturbances within the 
schizophrenia spectrum have recently attracted a great deal of interest, especially 
after empirical studies’ support of its predictive value for identifying transition 
to full-blown psychosis in those at risk, as well as for discriminating schizophre-
nia-spectrum disorders from other mental disorders (e.g., Nelson, Thompson, 
& Yung, 2012; Nordgaard & Parnas, 2014; Parnas et al., 2011). Such empirical 
studies have mostly employed detailed phenomenological interviews, with the 
Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience (EASE; Parnas et al., 2005) as the 
most prominent example (for a detailed review on studies using the EASE and 
other scales, see Parnas & Henriksen, 2014).
The notion of schizophrenia as a self-disorder is not new, however, with its 
roots traced to at least Jaspers if not Kraepelin (with his famous “orchestra with-
out a conductor” analogy), and other phenomenologically minded continental 
European psychopathologists such as Minkowski, Blankenburg, and Conrad. 
Schizophrenia at its core, they argued, consists of “a basic alteration of self-con-
sciousness” (Hur, Kwon, Lee, & Park, 2014). Contemporary theorists have further 
disentangled such an alteration (“ipseity disturbance,” from Latin ipse – “self ”) 
into a combination of factors termed “hyperreflexivity” and “diminished self- 
affection” (e.g., Sass & Parnas, 2003), a dominant theory which has guided many 
others’ pursuits in this matter.
According to Sass and Parnas (2003, p. 429), ipseity is the most fundamental, 
pre-reflective and vital level of the broadly defined “sense of self ” and concerns 
the “experiential sense of being a vital and self-identical subject of experience or 
first person perspective on the world,” which is tacit and property-less, but forms 
the very foundation of other more complex levels of the self (such as the “narrative 
self ” or “reflective self,” which is constructed as a second “layer” of selfhood over 
minimal self and is heavily influenced by social and interpersonal values). It is 
this level of selfhood that is severely disrupted in schizophrenia, as opposed to the 
identity-based or narrative self which is often affected in borderline personality 
disorder while leaving ipseity intact. For example, Nelson and colleagues (Nelson, 
Thompson, Chanen, Amminger, & Yung, 2013) found no relationship between 
EASE scores and borderline pathology. Within ipseity-disturbances, hyperre-
flexivity is defined as “exaggerated self-consciousness involving self-alienation,” 
whereas the aspect of diminished self-affection is defined as “diminished inten-
sity or vitality of one’s own subjective self-presence.” Together with the aspect 
of a disrupted grip or “hold” on the external world, they form the central point 
around which anomalies in self-experience revolve: in their 2003 paper, Sass and 
Parnas clearly state that “schizophrenia … is a self-disorder or, more specifically, 
an ipseity disturbance in which one finds certain characteristic distortions of the 
act of awareness” (p. 428, emphasis added).
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4   C. S. HUMPSTON
But these “characteristic distortions” are undoubtedly paradoxical in nature. In 
hyperreflexivity, internal mental events become so absorbing and attention-grab-
bing that one fully immerses oneself in the experiences at the cost of quite liter-
ally “losing oneself within oneself ” – that is, relinquishing one’s position as the 
experiencer and becoming merged with the subjective experience itself, hence the 
self-alienation despite heightened self-consciousness. This loss of one’s experiential 
position in turn contributes to the diminished sense of presence because one is 
no longer an active agent in charge of what one experiences, but a passive target 
of any experience one’s mind creates. This combination of heightened self-con-
sciousness and severe disruptions in agency is a core feature in schizophrenic 
self-disturbances: a consciousness so salient that it detaches from one’s subjective 
experiential field and gains a foreign quality, that is, an awareness that is “hyper-
real” (van Duppen, 2016). Although it may be too strong to state that the sense 
of agency completely disappears in schizophrenia, it is at least heavily damaged. 
Hyperreflexivity and diminished self-affection feed into each other and the end 
result is often a shattered sense of self, unable to maintain a hold or “grip” over 
either one’s internal mental states or external perceptions.
Indeed, what is left is nothing but a mere shadow of one’s own ipseity. When 
self-consciousness loses vitality and the most basic, taken-for-granted “mine-
ness” (i.e., the given property that anything I experience is my experience) of 
subjectivity, can it even be called an “awareness” anymore? Yet still, the entire 
focus of one’s existence is transferred to the field of experience at the same time, 
creating an illusory reality that is more “real” than what one may call “consensual 
reality.” I say this because in consensual reality, experience is imbued with a given 
basicness and the components of this reality do not always surface to the level of 
conscious scrutiny (for example, one can easily filter out irrelevant background 
noise and not focus on every little sensory detail in the environment), whereas 
in a hyperreflexive reality all experiences come to the forefront of awareness (a 
good example is the rapid escalation of the vividness of normally tacit thought 
processes, to the extent they become near-sensory) while robbing the individual 
of the ability to construct a coherent representation of the same events, internally 
and externally. Even one’s capacity to act intentionally appears foreign to the 
self, but is experienced as an extremely powerful outside force which one cannot 
possibly resist. The patient with schizophrenia is therefore perpetually trapped in 
a cognitive cul-de-sac, unable to navigate through the “realities” overwhelming 
their self-awareness while shaping the same awareness.
The self-disorder approach, in addition, is far from just theoretical speculation 
with little “real-life” supporting evidence. Apart from clinical studies’ increasing 
adoption of this approach (see the review by Parnas & Henriksen, 2014; mentioned 
above), emerging neurobiological theories (Mishara et al., 2016) and recent empirical 
studies on neurophysiology (Sestito, Parnas, Maggini, & Gallese, 2017; Sestito et al., 
2015), the notion of a fragmented self is also heavily reflected in first-person accounts 
of schizophrenia-spectrum psychoses (Humpston & Broome, 2016b; Payne, 2012). 
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PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY  5
It therefore has the advantage of bringing a sense of validity and trueness to the 
experiences of patients with schizophrenia despite being fundamentally abstract 
and amorphous concepts. Their constant search for meaning in-between “realities” 
would certainly resonate with many phenomologically-minded theorists as well as 
those with personal histories of psychosis, some of whom in the latter group have 
studied neuroscience themselves (Hawkes, 2012; Johnson, 2013; Vitasola, 2013).
This subjective experience is, first and foremost, a painfully confusing one. 
For those afflicted with schizophrenia, self-consciousness may seem to be an 
object of detached observation rather than a coherent subjectivity situated in the 
real world and imbued with tangible meaning. This loss of meaning may relate 
to the disembodiment account of psychosis (Stanghellini, 2009), where the self 
is reduced to a deanimated body and a disembodied spirit (p. 58) and the com-
monsensical “grasp” of everyday meanings is lost in quite a literal sense. In any 
case, it is impossible to be a part of a certain consciousness while observing the 
same consciousness from the external; in other words, the first-person perspective 
cannot be both the object and the subject simultaneously. Just as Stanghellini 
(2009) points out, “this radical dualism between a subject who’s thinking and 
an object that is conceived … pure consciousness and pure materialness” (p. 58) 
signifies the mere theoretical nature of schizophrenic awareness. It is, once again, 
an irreconcilable paradox. But this paradox must be resolved, even superficially, 
otherwise it will pose an even greater danger to what is already a fragile ipseity.
For the individual with schizophrenia, perhaps, the only solution to this para-
dox is to let go of logical and physical boundaries of the corporeal world and iso-
late oneself in a “world” made of thoughts alone. If there is no external boundary 
between self and other, if physical entities are simply simulated by thoughts, then 
everything can be brought back under control. In other words, the patient with 
schizophrenia takes up the existential position of a solipsist (Parnas & Sass, 2001) 
as a response to the overwhelming and persistent sense of entrapment caused by 
the constant bombardment of incoming information. But such a solipsistic posi-
tion can only lead to further, more severe entrapment – this time in a labyrinth 
of thoughts with very little room to navigate or escape. The question is about 
whether this is a willful adoption or some kind of involuntary retreat into one’s 
inner world, and I aim to point toward some potential answers to this question, 
which is currently unanswered by the self-disorder framework.
3. The minimally aware solipsist
The life of a solipsist is by definition a lonely one (its etymology comes from Latin 
solus, “alone”, and ipse, “self ” as in ipseity). Whether the concept of solipsism is a 
metaphysical (“only I and my mind exist”) or an epistemological one (“only the 
knowledge gained from my mind can be truly known” [Henriksen, 2013]), the self 
inevitably takes central stage – or should I say, the self is the central stage – of all 
thought and perception. Even the demarcation between self and other dissolves; 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [8
6.1
48
.76
.19
9]
 at
 03
:54
 08
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
7 
6   C. S. HUMPSTON
what is the meaning in others when your own self encompasses all existence 
already? From more than one perspective, the individual with schizophrenia is 
minimally aware, let alone in control, of one’s own ipseity, despite being quite 
literally “the center of the world.” Gerrans (2014) artfully summarizes the schiz-
ophrenic life-world in his book Measures of Madness as follows:
The schizophrenic attends, with special absorption, to experience itself. For the schiz-
ophrenic, experience becomes detached from its normal role in mediating encounters 
with the world and becomes, so to speak, the world – not in an ontological but a prac-
tical sense … given that there is nothing in the solipsist’s world but her own thoughts, 
agency is reduced to nothing other than the flow of mental events … she [the solipsist] 
is all-powerful, but in a virtual world – which is to say, in another sense, in no world 
at all. All the solipsist does is watch herself thinking. The result is a kind of omnipotent 
passivity. (pp. 214–215, emphasis added)
To add validity to the account of solipsism and of losing control over one’s think-
ing processes, Payne poignantly describes her own experiences of schizophrenia:
Here is a related conundrum: are you in control of your own thoughts? It sounds like 
a very odd question, but it’s at the core of the experience of schizophrenia. A dying 
person who is normal, even a person in front of a firing squad, has choices. A psychotic 
person is less, even minimally, in control of his thoughts. (2012, p. 899)
Whether from Gerrans’ academic point of view or Payne’s personal narrative, it 
should be clear that the patient with schizophrenia as a solipsist faces the unavoid-
able consequences of (apparently) gaining control of the external world and losing 
the same control over one’s internal thoughts. From Payne’s account, she states that 
even a person who is about to die, provided they are “normal,” has choices, but the 
psychotic person does not. However, perhaps the choice has already been made 
for the psychotic person, the “omnipotent passivity” (as Gerrans says) already 
forming their world. Do the patients themselves make the choice, or has all agency 
already been lost? I think the very concept of “omnipotent passivity” reflects the 
paradoxical nature of the schizophrenic awareness: perhaps patients with schiz-
ophrenia also experience an “omniscient oblivion,” where they are in control of 
the entire world because they are the world, but their very selves have diminished 
to near-nothingness for the same reason that they have become the world. Such a 
world is like a Möbius strip – there is no beginning or end, because the beginning 
is the end, and vice versa.
To stay in this state is, not surprisingly, an unsustainable act. In Sass, 1994 book 
The Paradoxes of Delusion, the author examines a very similar kind of paradox with 
regard to delusion formation and solipsism, which he calls “enslaved sovereign, 
observed spectator” (quoting Foucault):
It seems that, to remain a solipsist, the solipsist must inevitably waver between two 
unstable positions. When he concentrates on observing his own experiences, the solip-
sistic revelation of centrality disappears as the I-sense dissolves (thus denying the exist-
ence of the solipsistic self). But if he persists in holding to the solipsistic revelation, 
insisting on its meaningfulness and importance, he necessarily invokes a contradictory 
presupposition, a world in which at least one other consciousness exists to serve as an 
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PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY  7
alternative to his own consciousness, or to take his own consciousness as an object. The 
implication is certainly paradoxical: solipsism, strangely enough, seems to demand an 
other mind. (p. 71, emphasis added)
Of all the manifold layers of paradoxes, this paradox of “observed spectator” 
seems to be one of the most puzzling. If the solipsist has the ability to create con-
sciousness upon consciousness, then by definition each of these “consciousnesses” 
would need another one to serve as the alternative and to observe the previous 
consciousness. This certainly appears to be an infinite regress (coming back to 
the Möbius strip analogy). The requirement for the other mind will be discussed 
in detail in Section 6, but here I would like to put forward an argument from a 
first-person phenomenological perspective about how all these “consciousnesses” 
could, in theory at least, coexist.
I argue that the solipsistic worldview from the fragmented self of a patient 
with schizophrenia is a kind of double-awareness (not dissimilar to the idea of 
“delusion double-bookkeeping”) – a split integrity, a parallel centrality. Delusion 
double-bookkeeping is a term first coined by Bleuler and adds another layer of 
paradoxicality by itself – patients with schizophrenic delusions rarely question 
the veridicality of their thoughts, but neither do they tend to act in accordance 
with the content of their delusions. Solipsism here, however, goes beyond a simple 
delusional elaboration; it takes over the patient’s world (quite literally), but the 
patient is still exposed to the social or shared world. It is indeed paradoxical that 
patients may view physical reality as products of their own thoughts, but they still 
communicate with the rest of society (with the exception of severe catatonic states, 
which are rare nowadays). Some may argue that if patients were really “pure solip-
sists,” there would be little point in any kind of communication which might imply 
the acknowledgment of the physical world. But the crucial paradox is that patients 
are not solipsists by choice. On the one hand, the patient with schizophrenia is 
aware of the instability of the subjective world, but on the other hand they have 
to, as Sass argues, hold on to the solipsistic self because if they let go of even this 
last straw, their entire subjectivity would surely disintegrate. Solipsism, it seems to 
me, is not a choice of a self-deceiving disorder, but the end product of a long and 
painful reasoning process (no matter how irrational or biased) that has detached 
from one’s own agency. As such, the solipsist maintains the unstable parallelism, 
desperately trying to keep it at equilibrium but at the cost of the whole reaction 
falling apart. But before that point of disintegration, the solipsistic world has its 
own attraction. To use Sass’ example, just like the fact that the optic nerve itself 
is blind, solipsists do not see themselves exist; all they do, and all they have to do, 
is think. As for the external world, it is something that can be “materialised” at 
will – maintaining the link between the private-solipsistic and the social-shared 
worlds is a necessary but involuntary act.
In hyperreflexive states, thinking processes become localized, sometimes vocal-
ized or even materialized as objects of constant observation; in a very crude sense, 
whenever the schizophrenic solipsist thinks, these thoughts immediately become 
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8   C. S. HUMPSTON
the surrounding physical world. There is no experiential “gap” between the for-
mation (in this case, physical formation) and the proliferation of thoughts, hence 
at least to solipsists themselves, their thoughts stay true and pure – to themselves. 
Any thought born against such a background is almost unavoidably more real 
than physical reality, for the mere reason that there is simply nothing else to hold 
on to. Given the high prevalence of noncompliance and poor insight in schizo-
phrenia, it should not be surprising that solipsism is a widespread experience for 
many patients (Henriksen & Parnas, 2013), as the entire (re)orientation of their 
world calls not for introspection and common sense (e.g., Stanghellini, 2004), but 
for thoughts as reality. In addition, a solipsistic attitude can also lead to specific 
first-rank psychotic symptoms such as thought insertion, which I will discuss in 
Sections 4 and 5.
Solipsism is, however, not exclusive to the fully formulated stages of schizo-
phrenia, as it has also been recognized as one of the key features of the (very) early 
phases of a psychotic syndrome, in particular feelings of perplexity in delusional 
mood. Again, from the European phenomenological tradition, Conrad’s model of 
“beginning schizophrenia” (Bovet & Parnas, 1993; but also, Mishara, 2010) details 
five stages: Trema, Apophany and Anastrophe, Apocalyptic, Consolidation, and 
Residual states. Trema is the initial phase where one’s perceptual and experiential 
fields become hyper-salient, with a heightened sense of basic affective tension 
(somewhat like the tension an actor feels before performing on stage). Things may 
become strange in an inexplicable way; the natural response to such confusion is a 
search for meaning, that is, until the individual finally reaches a (delusional) con-
clusion to explain their unusual experiences – hence the revelation in Apophany. 
This second stage is termed an “aha experience” (Aha-Erlebnis), not dissimilar 
to a “Eureka moment,” which quite literally offers unprecedented explanations to 
everything the patient has been experiencing right up until this point.
According to Conrad, the “aha experience” signifies a loss of the patient’s ability 
“to distance from the experience, to achieve an exchange of reference frames or 
perspectives, to consider the situation – even temporarily – with the eyes of the 
others” (Broome et al., 2012, p. 178). The same kind of solipsism is involved, a 
fundamental failure to adopt someone else’s perspective and a full immersion in 
one’s own internal world. Apophany and Anastrophe can be seen as two sides of 
the same coin, which are inseparable and have direct relevance to the sense of 
solipsism. Conrad explains Anastrophe as “a reflexive turning back on the self in 
which the universe is experienced as revolving around the self as middle point” 
(p. 10). The patient’s self appears to be a passive middle point of all perceptions 
and events occurring in the world, where everything is intimately self-referen-
tial. Nevertheless, once again this gives rise to a paradox. Although the sense 
of perplexity during the Trema stage is temporarily alleviated by the delusional 
Apophany, the Anastrophe may bring back the perplexity because the self is again 
a passive entity at the mercy of all the confusion caused by a fragmented self-world 
relationship (see the case study in Humpston & Broome, 2016b). The patient with 
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PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY  9
schizophrenia as a minimally aware solipsist then becomes highly susceptible to 
a multitude of seemingly appealing “meanings,” as if the myriad of intangible 
meanings is calling out to them, rather than potentially choosing the meanings 
by one’s own volition (for a first-person report, see Hawkes, 2012). This provides 
fertile ground for the formation and maintenance of many of the “first-rank” 
positive symptoms of schizophrenia.
4. First-rank symptoms as pathologies of self-awareness
Schneiderian first-rank symptoms (FRS) are a subset of specific symptoms related 
to the schizophrenic psychopathology considered to have higher diagnostic appli-
cability; albeit far from pathognomonic (Carpenter, Strauss, & Muleh, 1973), in 
current diagnostic systems they still confer a higher (perceived) specificity to a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia, especially the International Classification of Diseases 
(ICD-10), where the presence of only one of the key FRS over a duration of one 
month could potentially grant such a diagnosis (Nordgaard, Arnfred, Handest, & 
Parnas, 2008). The theoretical and practical foundation for this emphasis on FRS 
may not be as strong as first speculated, however, from a phenomenological per-
spective, they still remain highly relevant at least, given the nature and commonal-
ity within FRS – that is, a breach in the boundary between self and other, internal 
and external. Some call this a dissolution of “ego-boundaries,” where the patient’s 
private mental space becomes permeable to external influences (Mullins & Spence, 
2003). Basic self-disturbances as the precursors of this permeability clearly have 
a strong, sometimes extreme impact on the afflicted individual’s awareness and 
understanding of self, leading to a complete reorientation of existential position 
(e.g., solipsism).
The breaches of ego-boundaries in FRS manifest as disorders of thought and 
perception, with a special focus on the externalization of internal stimuli, which 
include third-person auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) discussing the patient 
among themselves, passivity phenomena (of thought and/or action), symptoms 
such as thought insertion, broadcast, echo and withdrawal, and “bizarre delusions” 
such as delusions of alien control. I view the solipsistic attitude or lifeworld as 
the generative experience for this breach of ego-boundaries in schizophrenia; as 
argued above, in a solipsistic lifeworld, tacit and internal thoughts automatically 
become the external world with quasi-physical properties, therefore losing the 
necessity for an ego-boundary.
It is worth noting that I separate thought interference symptoms from bizarre 
delusions for the reason that I do not necessarily view a delusional elaboration 
as essential to, say, the context of thought insertion symptoms, which I shall 
further clarify. Similarly, I separate passivity phenomena from delusions of alien 
control because I believe the former could occur without forming a delusional 
explanation. Still, a lack of delusional elaboration or conviction does not mean 
FRS themselves are non-psychotic. It is widely accepted that the FRS are psychotic 
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10   C. S. HUMPSTON
symptoms, whereas self-disorders are not (Parnas & Henriksen, 2014); however, 
FRS do often have non-psychotic precursors in the forms of “as if ” experiences. 
I shall use the cases of AVH, thought insertion (TI), and passivity phenomena as 
examples to support a more unifying account of FRS.
The definition of a hallucination in any modality one could find in standard 
medical textbooks all seems to converge on the concept of “sensory perception 
in the absence of corresponding sensory stimuli.” While such a definition may 
be sufficient for the purpose of classification or even differential diagnosis, it 
certainly fails to capture the richness and complexity of the subjective experience 
of hallucinations, neither will it be able to explain why this “sensory perception” 
is often attributed to an external agent or why the voices (in the case of AVH) 
seem to have “a mind of their own” or even an individuality associated with them 
(Wilkinson & Bell, 2016). Indeed, in the context of FRS-related AVH, at least, the 
voices are “required” to describe the hearer in the third person. If the voices were 
in the second person, they would not count as FRS, even though second-person 
AVH may be more common (Nayani & David, 1996). This detached quality in 
third-person AVH contributes to the realness of the voices, especially when they 
appear to come from an external locus (although this does not necessarily reflect 
the underlying pathology; see Copolov, Trauer, & Mackinnon, 2004). However, 
just like inserted thoughts (see below), surely the hearer of the voices becomes 
aware of the same voices once they enter their mind? Surely there is an exter-
nal-to-internal permeation of perception? By “permeation” I mean a two-way 
process of diffusion between what is ego-syntonic and ego-dystonic, where the 
ego-boundary acts as a key “barrier” between the individual’s subjective world 
and consensual reality (to use a somewhat more concrete analogy in biology, it is 
just like the osmotic membrane of a cell).
From subjective reports (for a review of the phenomenology of voice-hearing, 
see Woods et al., 2014), it does not seem to be the case that the voice-hearer sud-
denly gains ownership and/or agency over the voices only because they can “hear” 
them. In fact, the awareness seems to further add to the realness and the non-self 
qualities of the voices, hence deepening the breach in ego-boundary. Based on 
the assumption that hallucinations really are sensory perceptions without sen-
sory stimuli, the voice-hearer should at least recognize the voices as not real (as 
there is clearly no one physically present, for example) instead of becoming more 
convinced of their reality and externality or even coming up with a (delusional) 
explanation for the voices’ presence. Maybe the key to solving this contradiction 
lies not in whether insight is preserved, but in whether hallucinations are always 
sensory in nature.
Claims like these may seem counterintuitive at first: it has to be that voices are 
called “voices” because they are heard! Why would the patient report voice-hear-
ing if they are not audible? But perhaps, as radical as it may sound, in many 
cases of voice-hearing the patient assigns auditory qualities to their experiences 
because such experiences often go beyond what language can describe. If someone 
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experiences “the sense of being spoken to or communicated with,” he or she 
would naturally think the communication is verbal even without actual words. 
Of course, such cases of “soundless voices” do not encompass all voice-hearing 
experiences; in fact, some of them are indeed clearly auditory as well (and these 
can be indexed as activation in language production and processing areas in the 
brain). But whether the auditory quality is a primary or a secondary feature of 
AVH is open to debate, I think, because the act of hearing (or indeed, any kind of 
sensory perception) would stay silent until the point at which the hearer commu-
nicates such a phenomenon to another. In other words, although this may sound 
obvious, we only assume someone else can hear, see or taste things because we 
can do the same. We can never fully be certain this is true, however, until this 
other person tells us so. By the process of telling there is inevitably an experien-
tial gap; by the act of transforming experience into words there must be a more 
second-order awareness, rather than accurately reflecting the raw “material” of 
experience. Qualitative researchers have indeed found support in first-person 
reports of the phenomenology of AVH that a large proportion of all AVH is not 
sensory (at least as defined in a physiological sense) at all (Jones & Luhrmann, 
2016; Jones & Shattell, 2016; Rosen et al., 2016).
Some AVHs are more akin to thought insertion (e.g., Humpston & Broome, 
2016a; Raballo, 2017), a notion which is also reflected in Billon, 2013 paper, where 
he states,
Inserted thoughts are similar to alien voices in many respects … voices are vehicles 
of thought which are not phenomenally conscious but of which the subject is aware 
… inserted thoughts and voices would differ in degree rather than in kind. Inserted 
thoughts would be inner voices, and alien voices would be outer inserted thoughts.  
(p. 309, emphasis added)
This difference in degree lies not in the locality but in the level or “amount” of 
agency and ownership one has over one’s experiences. Because one is aware of 
something it does not necessarily make this “something” a part of one’s subjec-
tivity; similarly, experiencing something does not always bring the experience 
under one’s conscious control.
Some may be inclined to argue, however, that if experiences like AVH or 
inserted thoughts really are more salient than everyday reality, as I speculate, why 
wouldn’t they become a part of the experiencer’s subjectivity, given the enhanced 
salience? I do not think heightened salience always equates to increased self-aware-
ness; indeed, it may well increase the awareness of such salience in general, but 
it is not experienced as a part of one’s self, especially when its contents appear 
ego-dystonic. Some patients with schizophrenia may actively “push away” the 
voices or thoughts as not their own, due to the misfit with their values, iden-
tity, and opinions, but this is more in a narrative sense of self rather than the 
minimal level of awareness of which I speak now. It is perhaps more likely that 
there is little second-order judgment involved in the first instance (see Section 5 
below), even in the face of an extremely salient external event – the patient with 
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schizophrenia has never been given the opportunity to assign whether the stimulus 
is internal or external because it is already decided for him or her even before the 
stimulus reaches a conscious status. Of course, the patient might come up with 
many different explanations and utilize all kinds or (meta)cognitive strategies to 
make sense of the experience, but this occurs after the raw stimulus has entered 
awareness. Whether it is a hallucinated voice or an inserted thought (or anything 
in-between), they all require a mind in which they can be contained, experienced, 
and expressed. Such experiences cannot be compared to communications between 
the patient and another physical entity in the external world; even though the 
thoughts and voices may also appear to possess their own mentality to qualify as 
an “other agent,” their presence is not a physical one.
For the patient with schizophrenia as a solipsist, however, physicality or corpo-
reality is not a prerequisite for existence. Thoughts are concrete, as they make up 
the mental world and at the same time become the world; consciousness is nothing 
but the ephemeral material that creates an eternal stream of thoughts. Perhaps, 
just perhaps, whether the thoughts are inserted, whether the voices are sensory, 
and all these questions, do not even matter for the solipsistic mind because there 
is no such thing as “other” – while everything can also be viewed as “other,” the 
centrality of the solipsistic mind and its instability, to take on another perspective, 
have already determined that other is self, and vice versa. The ego-boundary is 
permeable to the extent of dissolution.
Against such a background of fragmented self-awareness, anything other than 
thoughts may seem redundant. Nothing else exists as either a precursor to or a 
consequence of one’s thinking processes, and as such, actions, emotions, and 
behaviors would all appear unnecessary to say the least, if not completely useless. 
But thoughts are still action-guiding, and one still must act in order to function 
in the “real” physical world (after all, in order to continue thinking the solipsistic 
patient has to stay alive and needs a body!), and this creates another dilemma for 
the patient. To relinquish the will to act requires a will, a decision-making process 
in itself; in a world made of thoughts alone, the only will that exists is the patient’s 
own, so by definition, it must be the only free will of which the patient is aware. 
However (as Sass points out), to maintain solipsism one would strangely require 
the observation of another mind. Otherwise one would never be able to tell that 
their will is the only will – again, an infinite regress. But in order to find another 
mind, one has to first admit that the position of solipsism is unsustainable, if not 
invalid. This is perhaps the most confusing and painful predicament of a psychotic 
mind: a mind forever wandering in solitude, yet such solitude only exists with 
another. Indeed, it is a loneliness defined by multiple “consciousnesses,” and as a 
result, the psychotic mind is never alone. The action-guiding nature of thought 
becomes an otherness, hence the feelings of passivity, as if one has been taken over 
by this other agent whilst maintaining the solipsistic awareness.
None of these phenomena, I argue, actually require a delusional elaboration. 
The paradoxical awareness remains real so long as the patient remains aware of 
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only the egocentricity, but unaware of the non-physicality, of their own thinking. 
In other words, the patient’s entire existence revolves around thinking and not the 
physical world. Thinking, as it happens, is the most real occurrence an individual 
with psychosis could possibly encounter and the most tangible entity he or she 
could grasp. Fortunately, or unfortunately still, the solipsist cannot always achieve 
the status of being alone with one’s thoughts. In a different, or even separate, reality 
(as experienced by the psychotic mind), their awareness is inevitably influenced 
by other “real” people in their lives – this time in a more metacognitive sense.
5. Feeling vs. judgment of awareness
In this section, I will discuss the notions of agency and ownership and how the 
paradoxicality of a solipsistic self-awareness can act as a destructive force to both 
phenomena. When describing self-awareness, senses of agency and ownership 
frequently come to the forefront. Studies of agency and ownership have mostly 
focused on those of motor acts, with “agency” denoting the sense that I am the 
initiator of my action, whereas “ownership” indicates a sense of bodily awareness 
that my limbs make the movement. These two concepts, in the case of voluntary 
actions, are indistinguishable and only come apart in the case of passive or invol-
untary actions (Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008a), where the sense of agency 
diminishes (i.e., I no longer initiate the action), but the sense of ownership remains 
intact (i.e., it is still my limbs that are moved by someone else). A fundamental 
question is, however, does the feeling that it is my limb initiating the action always 
leads to the knowledge that I am the initiator of the action? Agency, it seems, is 
multifactorial (Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008b), with proprioceptive and 
conceptual components; similarly, the feeling of ownership can also be differen-
tiated from the judgment of ownership.
Such a distinction is very useful when studying actions and complements a 
variety of neurobiological and neurocognitive models of motor control (e.g., Frith’s 
Comparator Model), but may nevertheless appear insufficient when applied to 
thinking processes. When one speaks of “self-awareness”, it certainly does not limit 
itself to the awareness of actions only. To me, awareness of one’s own thoughts 
forms the basis of all other types of awareness, including that of (voluntary) 
actions, because an intention to move is obviously in the form of a thought at first. 
Some theorists have proposed that thoughts are the products of motor processes 
after all (e.g., Campbell, 1999) and that thinking, like motor acts, also has its own 
associated feeling and judgment of agency, although others argue otherwise (e.g., 
Vicente, 2014). Gerrans (2015) views inner speech as a kind of imaginary action, 
but also states that “speech, including inner speech, expresses thoughts but it is not 
thought itself ” (p. 297), and in cases of thought insertion (Gerrans calls the latter 
“delusions” of thought insertion, but I disagree that all inserted thoughts must 
have a delusional elaboration associated with them or reach delusional intensity 
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– some may well be simply “as if ” experiences), the loss of thought agency only 
explains the passivity of thinking but not the attribution to an external source.
It sounds to me as if the externality is part and parcel of the passivity; however, 
I think the external attribution (i.e., delusional elaboration) only occurs after the 
passivity of thinking takes hold and is the end result of an instinctive search for 
meaning rather than the inevitable consequence that “completes” the experience of 
thought insertion. Therefore, the awareness (or the lack thereof) in alien thoughts, 
or even voices, is a duplex phenomenon consisting of a generative experience 
which often (but not always) leads to a delusional explanation. I do not agree that 
because the inserted thoughts occur within a mind they will have to be owned by 
the mind in which they are found (my argument is in line with that by Bortolotti 
& Broome, 2009), especially when the entire ipseity is engulfed by solipsism and 
there is in essence no boundary between the mind, where the thoughts are found, 
and the “external origin” from where they appear.
The pre-reflective self-awareness is a concept interchangeable with ipseity or 
minimal self (Parnas & Handest, 2003), which is defined by the self as the imme-
diate subject of any given experience from a first-person perspective (Legrand, 
2007; Gallagher, 2000), whereas a reflective awareness is linked to the concept 
of “narrative self ” and entails deliberative evaluation of one’s mental states, such 
as the process of introspection influenced by social values. As mentioned above, 
reflective self-awareness is built upon the foundation of pre-reflective self-aware-
ness and can only be made explicit because the latter layer of selfhood remains 
tacit and implicit.
Gallagher (2014) emphasizes that the concepts of agency and ownership are 
twofold, with the “sense” of agency/ownership (pre-reflective) separable from 
the “attribution” of agency/ownership (reflective) which is very similar to the 
feeling vs. judgment of agency/ownership that Synofzik and colleagues propose: 
the former refers to feeling and experience, whereas the latter denotes realization 
and judgment. Gallagher also agrees that spatiality is not a strong prerequisite for 
ownership, however, and he offers a counterargument to that of Bortolotti and 
Broome (2009), suggesting that problems with ownership can all be linked back 
to those of agency.
Nevertheless, a lack or denial of ownership is not exactly the same as a damaged 
sense of ownership, and an all-or-none distinction is at best an over-simplification 
of a highly complex phenomenon. The very observation that the inserted thoughts 
originated from an external source (i.e., not from the patient) indicates that the 
agency or authorship has diminished. This does not necessarily mean that the 
patient cannot be introspectively or reflectively aware of such external thoughts as 
some sort of meta-representation (this may be seen as a lack of pre-reflective but 
not reflective ownership, and not the other way around). Once again, awareness 
does not have to entail subjectivity.
I say this because, while the experiencing individual is aware of the moment 
a certain intrusion occurs in their mind, such intrusion is not an integral part 
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of their ipseity. When a patient complains, for example, “I have thoughts being 
implanted into my mind” or “I hear voices (but no one else is present),” isn’t it 
just another paradox that violates the very nature of thinking and perception? 
Paradoxical, indeed; the patient does keep using the first-person pronoun “I” 
and its possessive form “my” which should at least denote some level of self-at-
tribution, but the patient is also adamant that the causal agents of these thoughts 
and voices are not himself or herself. But the only way to state that the experience 
is non-self is by using self-related attributive pronouns! One way to potentially 
better understand (not to resolve) this paradox is perhaps to view the first-person 
pronouns not in a literal sense, but as mere metaphors of a given mental event 
taking place in any mind (not just one’s own mind), due to the constraints of lan-
guage. There is no other means by which one could possibly describe a thought 
apparently found in one’s mind that one did not think, at least in English; one’s 
experience is always denoted by the first-person pronoun. In pathological cases, 
however, such usage does not necessarily mean the patient feels or even admits 
the experience is his or her own, but the judgment of ownership (or reflective 
ownership) is almost forced upon the patient when expressing the experience to 
another. Yet the judgment of ownership by definition implies willed attribution, 
so it cannot theoretically be “forced” upon anyone … where does the metaphor 
end and where does one’s “real” judgment begin?
This “real” judgment needs to be deliberative and involves some inferential 
process, and not just by simply using “I”. Nevertheless, from a solipsistic attitude, 
the “I” is the world and there is simply no need for any judgment about reality – 
everything is simultaneously real and unreal. Certainly, such an attitude will more 
often than not lead to delusional consequences and the further the patient dwells 
on this experience, the more ingrained the delusional systems become. It almost 
seems that a bizarre experience requires an equally bizarre explanation by nature. 
What happens after the patient becomes aware of these anomalous experiences 
is not a judgment of whether the experience is generated by, or even belongs to, 
the patient or someone else, but why it has taken place in his or her mental space.
Given the solipsistic position discussed above, perhaps the patient’s mental 
space is as good as any single mental space, because there is only one such space, 
but it does not offer the answer to this perpetual “why.” A feeling of non-self is 
not incompatible with a judgment of self-attribution by the use of words, because 
they all happen in the same primordial soup of thoughts and perceptions. Even 
the concept of insight, a concept valued by clinicians as the form of awareness 
that signals a return to normality, is a non sequitur. No one needs the insight into 
the “abnormal nature” of one’s experiences because the “symptoms” are one’s only 
self-experiences, and as such the insight into abnormality is just the insight into 
one’s ipseity. It may be true that one’s illness does not “define” one’s individuality 
or identity, but the latter forms of selfhood are of a far more narrative and auto-
biographical, rather than a basic and minimal, sense of self.
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The narrative self, I emphasize, is built upon the minimal self. It may not be 
disrupted or even damaged to the same extent, but its development will either 
come to a halt or become distorted in psychosis. When one is no longer aware of 
the boundary between self and other, it will be extremely difficult if not impossible 
for a socially defined, optimally functioning self to prosper. Without the common-
sensical “grip” of the world, (a lack of) feelings of agency and ownership often 
leads to judgments that are not shared or accepted by the physical world (in fact, 
a loosened “grip” is an additional component to hyperreflexivity and diminished 
self-affection; Sass & Parnas, 2003; Stanghellini, 2009). By common sense, I am 
not speaking of its definition as the ability to act, think, and perceive according to 
a collection of knowledge obtained from past experience with the expectation that 
everyone should at least have some of it; I am speaking of common sense as the 
taken-for-granted immersion in the world and relation with the other inhabitants 
of the same world. In this case, common sense is something one must have in order 
to construct a coherent self-experience and is only damaged in psychopathological 
states. In a way, this definition of common sense is perhaps more akin to the basic 
awareness that one is an action-guiding agent whose agency is only validated when 
considered relative to another agent with such an ability.
Whether thinking is also a motor act is not truly relevant to the argument here. 
Anything that originates from one’s mind is reflected in that of another, which is 
a kind of “reverse-solipsism”; but solipsism cannot be reversed because there is 
no other perspective to take. It may sound like a dramatic exaggeration, as some 
might argue, but the infinite loop of paradoxes is evident. Without solutions, these 
paradoxes occupy the core of what is left of one’s barely functioning ipseity – and 
the desperate efforts to keep one’s “sanity” intact push one deeper into the abyss 
of simply being aware.
6. The paradoxical self
So far, I have discussed various aspects of the schizophrenic psychopathology 
that in my opinion are best viewed as paradoxes of self-awareness driven by a 
solipsistic lifeworld; for the individual with schizophrenia, however, consciousness 
itself may just become another unsolvable and meaningless paradox in the most 
extreme case. Granted, being conscious forms the basis of being aware of one’s 
own consciousness, but what if such a consciousness can no longer constitute the 
building blocks of self-awareness? I would like to come back to Sass’ book The 
Paradoxes of Delusion, where he quotes Schopenhauer:
The twofold nature of consciousness … the antinomy whereby consciousness, the sup-
porter of the world, the universal condition of all that appears … every individual, 
completely vanishing and reduced to nothing in a boundless world, nevertheless makes 
himself the centre of the world. (pp. 81–82)
It is as if by one’s own psychological annihilation one is also rebuilt and reborn into 
the “observed spectator” or the “omnipotent passivity” to which Sass and Gerrans 
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refer, which is also a notion that resonates with that of R. D. Laing (Ratcliffe & 
Broome, 2012). For the patient with schizophrenia, a perpetual state of being 
observed and being passive almost appears a small price to pay in exchange for 
omnipotence, because even the observer is nothing but a creation (if not an exten-
sion) of the patient’s own mind. The merge between action and passivity, oblivion 
and omniscience, is perhaps the final paradox for the schizophrenic mind. Yet it is 
also a state of equilibrium, a carefully balanced stasis where the patient is simulta-
neously the owner and the owned, the subject and the object. As Sass repeatedly 
points out, strangely, the paradox of solipsism is that it needs an “other mind” 
for it to be valid, if it is ever valid. But by definition, solipsism is self-assuring 
and self-validating because consciousness is the entirety of this internal creation 
that one calls reality. In this sense, reality ends when one dies; reality only began 
when one first became conscious. This may ring true to a certain degree, however, 
because epistemically it is impossible to know for absolute certainty that reality 
will continue after one’s consciousness ends, but because we are aware of other 
minds, we are assured that reality will likely continue, given that it will still be 
perceived by these other minds.
I think, perhaps, the patient with schizophrenia takes up the solipsistic position 
not by personal choice but because his or her self is “calling out” for such a position 
in order to remain an integrated construct. The self has to, after all, preserve itself; 
and as such, when the self is threatened with potentially permanent disintegration 
by schizophrenic self-disturbances, it is almost a protective mechanism to enforce 
the centrality of the self, as if an undamaged self is still in charge. This goes beyond 
a belief or even a defense mechanism; sufferers do not have to believe what their 
minds tells them or defend their egos with grandiose ideals, sufferer simply have 
to be alive – as long as they are alive, the self can continue the cycle of solipsism 
and maintain the fragile stasis while entrapped in endless paradoxes. In other 
words, the initial psychological annihilation is only an illusion, a smoke screen 
to react to the threat of disintegration. The fact is that the self is held together by 
a new set of rules, the rules of a minimally aware solipsist.
As tempting and effective as this “solution” might be, however, the solipsist 
position is challenged, or even further, threatened by other minds – the very minds 
at the same time demanded by the solipsist to help sustain his or her centrality. 
Solipsism certainly sounds like a delusion (belief or not), but to me it is far more 
than an irrational method of inference. I say this because no (active) inference is 
needed in order to adopt the solipsist position; it is the final straw to preventing 
the dissolution of ipseity, a last resort to keep the self from collapsing. It might be 
a dangerous and desperate “cure” but it is certainly the lesser of the two evils (the 
other being a complete shutdown of one’s psychological functions). This is not 
the same as incorrigibility in the maintenance of delusions, but a default “paral-
lel world” to which the self returns when facing the ultimate threat – a position 
of nothingness, yet also a position of infinite possibilities. The self cannot be 
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annihilated if it does not exist in the first place, or at least it does not exist where 
the threat is any more.
7. Theoretical and empirical implications
Acknowledging the paradoxical nature of self-awareness in schizophrenia has a 
number of theoretical and empirical, sometimes clinical, implications. The para-
doxes I have discussed here are clearly multifactorial and complex, but they should 
not act as a barrier to understanding schizophrenia as a disorder of self-awareness. 
However, are such paradoxes specific to schizophrenia? What about other disor-
ders of the self, such as dissociative identity disorder or depersonalization disorder 
(see Sass, Pienkos, Nelson, & Medford, 2013 for a detailed discussion)? It is often 
recognized in the latter cases that the self-disturbances are not delusional, that is, 
not psychotic, and reality testing remains intact; but if the disordered self in schiz-
ophrenia really is not a delusional one as I argue, would this render the difference 
between schizophrenia and dissociation negligible? I think one needs to be very 
careful when differentiating the level of selfhood affected in these two disorders: 
the ipseity (a narrower and more basic definition than selfhood) is fragmented 
like shattered glass in schizophrenia, and solipsism acts as the adhesive trying to 
hold the pieces together, but the marks remain, whereas the self in dissociation 
has plasticity like beads of mercury which can come together or fall apart without 
leaving a mark (an analogy used by Scharfetter, 2008 which is also Laingian). In 
other words, the self in dissociation does not need this “adhesive” and therefore is 
not solipsistic. As a result, the paradoxes associated with solipsism will not apply 
to dissociation. Nevertheless, empirical studies need to be carried out in order to 
identify and measure the potential experiential differences and similarities, as well 
as perhaps the neurobiological substrates, between the two disorders.
Research efforts in neurobiology have in the past been considered incompatible 
with those in, for example, social psychology and phenomenology, but this has 
started to change towards multidisciplinary collaborations. While mental events 
may not be defined simply as epiphenomena from brain processes, it is needless 
to say that the former cannot possibly occur without the latter. Biological research 
by itself is insufficient, however, to disentangle all the complexities and nuances 
of say, ipseity without being informed by phenomenology, and phenomenological 
research cannot achieve its full meaningfulness without establishing neurological 
bases. Even in the clinical setting, a heavy bias toward one or the other approach 
can do more harm than good. Solipsism, for example, may have beneficial prop-
erties as a protective mechanism against total fragmentation of the self, at least 
initially; if the clinician treats this as nothing but a delusion to be eliminated 
by antipsychotic medication, the only shield against psychological annihilation 
(albeit a maladaptive one) is taken away, which may drive the patient into deeper 
despair. On the other hand, if the clinician is determined to not use any kind of 
biomedical treatment, psychotherapy alone may not be effective against the florid 
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psychosis as positive symptoms develop. Extreme care and balance are therefore 
called for in order to manage the subtler symptoms of schizophrenia, especially 
in the early stages. What should be placed first and foremost, however, is the cli-
nician’s willingness to listen (even if they cannot understand) to what the patient 
tells them, as this forms the very basis of any kind of therapeutic alliance (Parnas 
& Henriksen, 2014).
8. Conclusion
To conclude, in this article I have discussed various aspects of schizophrenic 
symptoms as disorders of self-awareness, focusing on their paradoxical nature and 
how they might contribute to the formation of more florid manifestations (such as 
auditory-verbal hallucinations and thought insertion). It may appear that I have 
not provided a solution to the paradoxes; however, the reality of the matter is that 
there is no such solution. But this does not have to be a negative or unfortunate 
outcome of a schizophrenic awareness. The mysteries of consciousness, patholog-
ical in this case, will continue to attract theorists, experimenters, and clinicians, 
despite perhaps knowing that there is no final point of unification for all explana-
tions. Nevertheless, I believe that if one keeps furthering their understanding of 
the self, they will eventually reach the point where they can understand another 
human being’s suffering and take actions to alleviate it. Solutions, perhaps, will 
then emerge, not as attempts to resolve the paradoxes of awareness, but as genuine 
acts of understanding in order to ease the pain caused by such paradoxes.
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